Michael Rudolph 2004:

 

"The Pan-Ethnic Movement of Taiwanese Aborigines and the Role of Elites in the Process of Ethnicity Formation"

 

1. Introduction

2. Aborigine elites: Interaction during authoritarian rule

3. Aborigine elites: Interaction in times of multiculturalism

4. The view from the countryside

5. Conclusion

 

Abstract of the paper presented at the workshop on "Multiple and Diasporic Identities: National and Ethnic Belongings in East Asia, and Europe" at Aalborg University, Denmark, September 15-16, 2000 (published in: Flemming Christiansen and Ulf Hedetoft (eds), The Politics of Multiple Belonging: Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe and East Asia, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, p. 239-254).

 

When we try to understand processes of ethnicity formation in Taiwan, we have to distinguish two periods: the period of authoritarian rule and its aftermath until 1990; and the period of Taiwanization and democratization since 1990.[1] This distinction seems necessary because the conditions under which the formation of ethnicity and its manifestation could take place in Taiwan were very different during these two periods: In the first period, ethnicity was suppressed by the Nationalist Party (KMT) -state that conjured ethno-cultural homogeneity of all Chinese in order to have a legitimisation to ‘recover the mainland’. In the second period, ethnicity was fostered and enhanced by the government that now - after a profound 'personnel'-transformation in its interior from Mainlander- to Hoklo-domination - had subscribed to building up a multicultural society vis-à-vis the mainland and its claims of ethno-cultural homogeneity of all Chinese.[2] The former discourse of homogeneity was now replaced by a discourse of ethnic heterogeneity and – in order to enhance a feeling of togetherness in the new frame of reference - a discourse of hybridity. This process can be particularly well observed in the development of the Aborigine movement in Taiwan and the efforts of Aborigine elites[3] to adapt their cultural representations to the changing paradigms.

From the founding of the first Aborigine rights group in 1984 until the establishment of the Council of Aborigine Affairs (xingzhengyuan yuanzhuminzu weiyuanhui) under the central government in 1996, the pan-ethnic movement of Taiwanese Aborigines (Yuanzhumin=YZM)[4] has always been among the smallest of all social and ethno-political movements evolving during the political transformation process since the eighties. This is not astonishing if one considers the small percentage of Austronesians in Taiwan (only approx. 1,6% of the total population) and the fact that they consist of at least 9 different cultural groups with different languages.[5] Nevertheless, it has turned out to be one of the most vigorous and successful movements with a growing degree of attention and support from Taiwanese society - much more than for instance the movement of the Hakka, which has been loosing much attention and momentum since its emergence in 1988, in spite of the comparatively large number of Hakka in Taiwan (approx. 9%).[6] However, as testified by the results of Aborigine elections[7] as well as by the low participation in demonstrations for the ethnonymYuanzhumin’, for YZM-government institutions on the central level, and for cultural and political autonomy, the main motor of the Aborigine movement were a handful of elites that was in general only badly supported by the majority of members of Aborigine society.[8]

 

The paper investigates the reasons why ethnicity in Taiwan's Aborigine society had its origins mainly in the elite strata and not in other parts of Aborigine society. What motivated Aborigine elites to engage in ethnic politics and identity construction in Taiwan in the time of changing political paradigms, while common people in the villages hardly showed any ambitions to fight for more cultural recognition?

 

My findings suggest that motivations and incentives for intellectual and political elites in Taiwan’s Aborigine society to participate in political activism and identity construction were much higher than for ordinary people in this society. Both in the period of authoritarian rule in Taiwan and in the period of Taiwanization and multiculturalism that started after 1990, political activism of elites was linked to competition either between Aborigine elites or – in the latter case - between Aborigine and Han elites. Where members of  bi-cultural Aborigine elites in the first period had struggled for the rare positions as mediators between Han- and Aborigine society, they soon recognized their new opportunities in the period of Taiwanese nativism and sought mutual solidarity in order to enlarge their common territory vis-à-vis ethnic Han elites. This aim could best be reached by emphasizing the Aborigines’ particularity. In both periods, competition and conflict between different elites and struggle for political power played an important role, as it has been suggested by Paul Brass in his instrumentalist approach. Nevertheless, there was still another important motivation for educated Aborigines to engage themselves in politics. The activism must also be seen as a reaction to the strong feelings of stigma that had been imposed on Aborigine identity for many decades and that now could be overcome with the help of techniques provided by anti-systemic and system-critical forces in- and outside of Taiwan. In a study on Burakumin identity in Japan, George De Vos and Hiroshi Wagatsuma (1966) suggest that political activism may be an alternative way to compensate for social stigma and simmering discontent with discrimination.[9] Hence, discontent with discrimination on the basis of collective social stigma must not be underestimated as a reason why Aborigine elites took to political activism. The contact of a growing number of Aborigines with higher school education as well as with certain elite groups outside of Aborigine society stimulated the process of consciousness formation. Societal groups with a strong catalytic function in the first period were intellectuals within the Taiwanese opposition party DPP, Taiwan's anthropologists, foreign missionaries and the PCT. In the second period, these influences were reinforced by a further factor outside of Taiwan, i.e., the link to the Fourth World Movement that was provided with the help of the church and the anthropologists. By this linkage and by adoption of the strategies of this movement, Taiwan’s Aborigines were able to become an influential pressure group within Taiwanese society. 

 

The attitudes of ordinary people towards Aborigine identity, however, were very different. Though the style of interaction with Han culture varied according to the social system of every ethnic group, people in general didn’t like to emphasise their Aborigine origin or cultural background in front of outsiders, sometimes they even refused to admit it. Instead, they were very eager to adapt their actions and attitudes to the Taiwanese standards as they perceived them – for example emulating Taiwan’s middle and lower social strata. On one hand, this behavioural pattern enhanced the adoption of cultural conceptions and consumption styles of the larger society.[10] On the other hand, it caused a rejection of one’s own Aborigine culture, including language, traditional names and certain traditional habits that were perceived as a symbol for the savageness and backwardness of Aborigines, like headhunting, tattooing, buildings in traditional style etc.. Most salient was the dislike to be defined as a member of another cultural group not belonging to the ethnic Chinese. Further attitudes that pointed to a low degree of identification with Aborigine culture were the indifferent attitudes of ordinary people toward Aborigine land or toward the intrusion of industries that caused the destruction of environment and living sites, but that created working places and brought surplus money by (illegal) selling and letting of Aborigine land.

 

These observations suggest that different self-perceptions and behavioural patterns of Aborigine elites and ordinary people developed because different segments of Aborigine society attached themselves to different groups of reference and value-orientations within Han society. As the work of culture preservation and revitalization pursued by Aborigine elites was frequently morally and financially supported by Taiwanization circles, environmental protection groups and so on, Aborigine elites also often identified or at least sympathized with their world-views; by establishing the concept of ‘Aboriginality’ (Stainton 1995), they finally achieved a high amount of recognition in Taiwanese society; in contrast, common people felt much more attracted by the value-orientations of a consumption-oriented Han middleclass. Differently from the elites who could rely on their upper class mentors, they did not get any support from the side of middle class and middle educated Han. Instead, they were often discriminated against because of their low degrees of qualification and their different mentality (for instance their ‘low working morale’). Most Aborigines and Han shared the conviction that Aborigine integration would be successful with 'only a little bit more effort from their side'.[11] To free oneself from one’s inferior status and to be engaged in such well respected jobs as in the police or in the army, a high degree of conformity was necessary. For those who longed for social mobility within Han society, the identity symbols propagated by the intellectuals hence did nor make much sense and were often perceived as an impediment.

In sum, there is much evidence that people within both segments of Aborigine society harboured a strong inclination to assimilate to Han society or at least to adapt themselves to the expectations within Han society.[12] Nevertheless, contrary to the elites, ordinary people from the villages neither had the tools to develop alternative ways to handle their feelings of stigma and inferiority, nor did they feel any support or incentives to expose their feelings of discontent toward the members of Han middle classes, where most people believed that the Aborigines predicament was due to the lack of diligence of Aborigines rather than a result of social injustice.

 

List of Literature

 

Allio, Fiorella, 1998, "The Austronesian Peoples of Taiwan: Building a Political Platform for Themselves", in: China Perspectives No.18, 7/1998:52-60.

 

Brass, Paul, 1991, Ethnicity and nationalism: theory and comparison, (Sage Publications) London 1991:25f;8.

 

Chang Mao-kuei, 1996, "Political Transformation and the 'Ethnization' of Politics in Taiwan", in: Schubert, Gunter/ Schneider, Axel, 1996 (ed.): Taiwan an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert - Gesellschaftlicher Wandel, Probleme und Perspektiven eines asiatischen Schwellenlandes, (Mitteilungen des Instituts fuer Asienkunde Hamburg vol. 270) Hamburg 1996:135-152.

 

De Vos, George / Wagatsuma, Hiroshi (ed.), 1966, Japan's Invisible Race, (University of California Press) Berkely 1966.

 

Fu Yangzhi, 1994, "Taiwan Yuanzhumin kunjing de guiyin jieshi  - bijiao Hanren guandian yu Yuanzhumin guandian" [The anticipated reasons for the predicament of Taiwanese Aborigines - Comparison of Han and Aborigines' perspectives], in: Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology Academia Sinica, No.77, Taibei, 1994:35-87.

 

Huang Yinggui, Jiang Bin, Chen Maotai, Shi Lei, Qu Haiyuan, 1993, "Zunzhong Yuanzhumin de zicheng" [Respect for the name that the Yuanzhumin gave themselves], in: Zhang Maogui, 1993a, Zuqun guanxi yu guojia rentong, Guojia zhengce yanjiu zhongxin (Caituan faren Zhangrongfa jijinhui), (Yeqiang chubanshe) Taibei, 2/1993:191-197 (first puplished in Independent Morning Post, 16.5.1992).

 

Institute of Ethnology Academia Sinica, 1992, Shanbao fudao cuoshi jixiao zhi yantao [An evaluation of the assistance measures towards mountain compatriots], (Executive Yuan) Taibei 6/1992.

 

Li Yiyuan, 1992, Wenhua de tuxiang: Zongjiao yu zuqun de wenhua guancha [Portraits of culture (vol. 2): observations of religion and ethnic culture], (Yunchen wenghua cbs) Taibei 1992.

 

Rudolph, Michael, 1996, "'Was heisst hier 'Taiwanesisch' - Taiwans Ureinwohner zwischen Diskriminierung und Selbstorganisation [Who has the Right to call himself 'Taiwanese'?' - Taiwan's Aborigines between Discrimination and Self-Organization]", in: Schneider, Axel u. Gunter Schubert (ed.), Taiwan an der Schwelle zum 21. Jh. - Gesellschaftlicher Wandel, Probleme und Perspektiven eines asiatischen Schwellenlandes, Mitteilungen des Instituts fuer Asienkunde Hamburg, vol. 270, Hamburg 1996:285-308.

 

Rudolph, Michael, 2000a, Assimilation oder kulturelle Revitalisierung - Ursprünge und Implikationen der Identitäts-Bewegung taiwanesischer Ureinwohner (Yuanzhumin) 1983-1996 (Assimilation or Cultural Revitalization – Origins and implications of the identity movement of Taiwan`s Aborigines (Yuanzhumin) 1983-1996),  Doctorial thesis handed in at the Department of Oriental Studies and Archaeology of Heidelberg University in October 2000.

 

Rudolph, Michael, 2002 (in press),  'The Quest for Difference vs. the Wish to Assimilate: Taiwan's Aborigines and their Struggle for Cultural Survival in Times of Multiculturalism', in: Rubinstein, Murray & Paul Katz, Religion and the Formation of Taiwanese Identities, St.Martins/Palgrave, New York.

 

Stainton, Michael, 1995, Return our land: counterhegemonic presbyterian Aboriginality in Taiwan, (York University) Canada 1995.

 

Wang Fu-Chang, 1989, The unexpected resurgence: ethnic assimilation and competition in Taiwan, 1945-1988 (Ph.D. dissertation , Dpt. of Sociology) University of Arizona 1989.

 

Wang Xiaohui, 1996, "Yanzheng Taiwan Yuanzhumin xueyuan zhi yuan" [Confirming the blood relationship origin of Taiwan’s Aborigines], in: Renmin ribao (Haiwaiban) 16.2.1996:5.

 

Wei Yijun, 1997, Ling yi ge shijie de lailin: Yuanzhumin yundong de lilun shijian [Another world approaches: Realization of theorie in Taiwan’s Aborigine movement], (M.A. thesis an der Nationalen Qinghua-Universitaet) Taiwan 1997.

 

Xie Shizhong, 1987a, Rentong de wuming yu Taiwan Yuanzhumin de zuqun bianqian (Abstract: Ethnic contacts, stigmatized identity, and pan-Taiwan Aborigineism: a study on ethnic change of Taiwan Aborigines), (Zili wanbao she) Taibei, 7/1987.

 

Xie Shizhong, 1987b, "Yuanzhumin yundong shengcheng yu fazhan lilun  de chengli: yi Beimei yu Taiwan wei li de chubu tantao" (Abstract: Towards Dynamic Theories of the Origin and Development of Aborigine Movements: The Cases of North America and Taiwan), in: Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology Academia Sinica, No. 64, Taibei, 10/1987:139-177.

 

Xie Shizhong, 1987c, "Minzuzhi daode yu renleixuejia de kunjing - Taiwan Yuanzhumin yundong yanjiu de lizi" [Ethnographic morals and the dilemma of the social anthropologist: The example of research on Taiwan’s Aborigine movement], in: Con-Temporary, Nr.20, 12/1987:20-30.

 

Xie Shizhong, 1992, "Pianli qunzhong de jingying: Shilun 'Yuanzhumin' xiangzheng yu Yuanzhumin jingying xianxiang de guanxi" [Preliminary discussion of the relation between the symbol 'Yuanzhumin' and the elites phenomenon], in: Daoyu bianyuan, Nr. 5, Taibei, 10/1992:52-60.

 

Xie Shizhong, 1994, "Shandi gewu zai nar shangyan?" [Where are the songs and dances from the mountains put on stage?], in: Zili zaobao 19.12.1994.

 

Xu Muzhu, 1990, "Taiwan Yuanzhumin de zuqun rentong yundong: xinli wenhua yanjiu tujing de chubu tantao" [The ethnic identity movement of Taiwanese Yuanzhumin: a prelimineary discussion of the psycho-cultural approach], in: Xu Zhengguang/Song Wenli, 1990, Taiwan xinxing shehui yundong, (Juliu tushu gongsi) Taibei, 1990:127-156.

 

Yuanxuan (Yuanzhumin mission committee of the PCT-general assembly), 1993, Taiwan jidu zhanglao jiaohui zonghui Yuanzhumin xuandao weiyuanhui chengli sishi zhounian ji guoji Yuanzhuminnian jinian tekan [Special issue on occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Yuanzhumin mission committee of the PCT-general assembly and on occasion of the year of indigenous people], (Yuanxuan) Taibei, 8/1993.

 

 

[1] The ‘taiwanization’ (‘bentuhua) that took place in the course of the increasing quest of Taiwan’s population for political and cultural independence from the mainland can also be translated as ’nativization’.

[2] Hoklo-Chinese constitute the majority of the island’s population (75%). The so called ‘Mainlanders’, who immigrated from the mainland with Chiang Kai-shek after 1945 and who suppressed Taiwans population in the following four decades until the lifting of martial law in 1987, make up only 14% of Taiwan’s population. Another group of Han-Chinese who settled on Taiwan before the arrival of the Mainlanders are the Hakka (9%). The only Non-Han on Taiwan are the Aborigines (Yuanzhumin=YZM), who today comprise no more than 1.6% of the population.

[3] ‘Aborigine (YZM) elites’ (Yuanzhumin jingying) and  'Aborigine intellectuals’ (Yuanzhumin zhishi fenzi) are terms commonly used in Taiwan. A first classification of ‘Aborigine-elites’ has been made by the Taiwanese anthropologist Xie Shizhong (1987a). Xie distiguishes three kind of elites: (1) the ‘traditional Aborigine elites’ like chiefs and schamans, (2) the KMT-loyal ‘political Aborigine elites’ (Yuanzhumin zhengzhi jingying), who were not recruited from the modern educational system yet and who only partially were traditional elites; and (3) the ‘intellectual Aborigine elites’ (Yuanzhumin zhishi jingying), who splitted into two main antagonistic 'subgroups’ in the beginning of the 1980s, i.e., the young KMT-loyal ‘political Aborigine elite’ (Yuanzhumin zhengzhi jingying) and the ‘resisting Aborigine elites’ (Yuanzhumin kangzheng jingying) who were organized in the pan-ethnic movement (Xie 1987a:75 u. Xie 1992a:54). In general, only the members of the ‘resisting Aborigine elite’ were refered to as ‘Aborigine intellectuals’ und ‘intellectual Aborigine elites’ (Wei Yijun 1997:5).

[4] The term Yuanzhumin (hereafter: YZM) has been choosen in 1984 by the 'resisting Aborigine elite' (Yuanzhumin kangzheng jingying) as a substitution for the official term 'mountain compatriots'. It took ten years until this new ethnonym was officially recognized by the second constitution amendment in June 28, 1994, and two more years until the government yielded to pressure from YZM-legislators to establish a YZM-representing committee on the central level.

I principally agree with Xie Shizhong (1994) who suggests that in research literature 'YZM' should only be used as a term for 'Aborigines with awakened consciousness'. Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity, I here use the term 'YZM' to refer to 'Taiwanese Aborigines' in a more general sense.

[5] Anthropoligical findings suggest that there originally dwelled more than 25 different Austronesian groups on the island. Most of them assimilated to Han society in the course of the last two centuries. The cultures and languages of the Ami (37,5%=120.704 Ps.), Atayal (23,6%=75.995 Ps.), Paiwan (18,9%=60.764 Ps.), Bunun (10,9%=35.041 Ps.), Puyuma (2,5%=7.989 Ps.), Cao (2,2%=7.140 Ps.), Rukai (2,1%=6.815 Ps.), Saisiat (1,9%=3.884 Ps.) and Yami (1,2%=3.497 Ps), however, are still alive. 

[6] One of the reasons for this decline of interest is the difficulty to adapt the Hakka movement to the taiwanization-movement: Hakka – who were once regarded as an ethnic group different from the Han -  are reluctant to give up their 'zhongyuan-(=Center of Chinese Culture) identity'  which has been constructed only very recently as a reaction to discrimination by the Han.

[7] Aborigines have quotas for own representatives in the parliament (Rudolph 1996).

[8] An exception were the demonstrations for land return (huan wo tudi yundong) in 1988, 1989, and 1993. Numbers of participants each time reached from one to two thousand (Rudolph 1996).

[9] De Vos and Wagatsuma state: "As a result of involvement, the individual may participate in politically deviant behavior rather than resort to individual extra-legal deviancy. Far left political movements are socially integrative insofar as they seek means of effecting change without a denial of self-identity (...). The individual who takes political action is mobilizing his energy toward a cause rather than falling back from it in either resignation or apathy, as is the case with a great majority of the Burakumin." (De Vos/Wagatsuma 1966:259).

[10] This also included the adoption of certain Han stereotypes of Aborigine identity in the tourism sector, as Xie shows in Xie 1992c.

[11] Fu Yangzhi 1994.

[12] This is also testified by the relatively high degree of intermarriage of Aborigines and Han: Data of Li Yiyuan (1992:253f) indicate that the percentage of Aborigine woman marrying Han men in 1984 almost reached 40%.